Evo Morales as the "Second Coming of Che"

The New York Times Magazine has a profile by David Rieff of Bolivian indigenous leader and founder of MAS (Movement Towards Socialism), Evo Morales. I urge you to read it, but there are some points I want to emphasize.

First is the Bush administration's attitude towards Morales:

Michael Shifter, a senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue, a policy group in Washington, and one of the shrewdest and most experienced American observers of Latin America, told me that he has been struck by the depth of conviction in Washington that Morales is dangerous. "People talk about him as if he were the Osama bin Laden of Latin America," Shifter told me, adding that, after a recent lecture Shifter gave at a military institution, two American officers came up to him and said that Morales "was a terrorist, a murderer, the worst thing ever." Shifter replied that he had seen no evidence of this. "They told me: 'You should. We have classified information: this guy is the worst thing to happen in Latin America in a long time."' In Shifter's view, there is now a tremendous sense of hysteria about Morales within the administration and especially at the Pentagon.

It has happened before. During the 2002 Bolivian elections, when Morales was a first-time candidate little known outside of the country, the U.S. ambassador at the time, Manuel Rocha, stated publicly that if Morales was elected, the U.S. would have to reconsider all future aid. Most observers, and Morales, too, who speaks of the episode with a combination of amusement and satisfaction, say that it got him and MAS at least 20 percent more votes. The current U.S. ambassador, David Greenlee, has been far more circumspect. But if anything, Washington's view of Morales has only hardened. And the reason for that, unsurprisingly, is Hugo Chávez's increasing role. As Michael Shifter puts it, "There is this tremendous fear that Chávez is living out the Fidel Castro dream of exporting revolution throughout Latin America and destabilizing the region - something that wasn't done during the cold war and is now being financed by Venezuelan oil."

Hysteria is the right term to use here. Regardless of how one feels about Morales, he would still exist without Hugo Chávez. If he chooses to attain his goals through democratic means, what will the Bush administration be able to complain about? As for my feeling towards Morales, I'm largely on the fence. One needn't be a genius to realize that someone like Morales doesn't occur in a vacuum and that he speaks for a major portion of Bolivia's population that has all too often been ignored. On the other hand, I have a natural skepticism of anyone  - regardless of their political affiliations  - who believes bombast is an effective substitute for practical solutions.

What the Bush administration fails to realize is that their criticism of Morales like their over-the-top criticism of Hugo Chávez only strengthen Morales and Chávez. That speaks volumes about how this administration is regarded by our closest neighbors.

Morales got his start as leader of the cocaleros, the coca growers. Coca has long been a part of Andean culture. One of the most effective cures against soroche (altitude sickness) is a tea brewed from coca leaves. So I have to agree with much of this:

Only on the depenalization of coca production does he remain absolutely adamant and defiant, and in this, it must be said, he enjoys considerable popular support among not just the coca growers but also many Bolivians who believe that the cocaine problem should be addressed principally on the demand side, in the United States and Europe. A popular T-shirt in the markets of La Paz reads, "Coca leaf is not a drug." [my emphasis]

The "War on Drugs" has hardly been a success and the focus on the supply side is probably one of  the greatest reasons why. Telling a nation that they should change centuries of behavior because gringos can't stop putting powder up their nose is rather arrogant to put it mildly.

Comments

[eduardo]

I also have become tired with the same rhetoric against the US embassy, neoliberals, oligarchy and multinational companies, which seems to be the subject of any public statement that Evo makes. However, I understand that it's part of the game to convince the campesinos that he means business.

However, there is another side to Evo, which I think has a lot to do with his Vice-Presidential candidate Alvaro Garcia Linera. He seems to be much more rational and able to better explain the reasoning behind their positions.

There's a reason why Evo has refused to debate the other candidates. I think his advisors have realized that he comes across as too confrontational by preferring to say a lot without talking about the proposals, which seem to be less radical as others have previously feared.

[civil truth]

Morales has a very difficult needle to thread if he is to create a different model for his country. On the one hand, he has to stir up enough discontent based upon legitimate grievances and offer hope for change that he can get elected without painting himself into a demagogic corner with his rhetoric that he ends up bringing down the legal and economic infrastructure, thereby bringing down the economy and leading to dictatorship, as in Zimbawe. He needs to find a way to utilize Bolivia's oil wealth in a way that builds up a sustainable infrastructure through appropriate capital investment -- unlike most petro countries where extractive wealth produces corruption and huge wealth for a small group leading to consumptive spending and non-useful investment (e.g. Persian Gulf states). It will take some luck for him to avoid destabilization by the U.S. We'll have to see if Morales and his compatriots can pull this off, but the NYT article suggests some hope that he might be able to temper grievance with a realism to find a way that will work to improve living conditions and avoid the errors of past models. It would be a disaster for all if Morales does follow the political methods of Chavez and Castro in his endeavor to right social wrongs.

As far as the cocoa industry, while I understand the culpability of buyers, the drug trade in recent years has accumulated such a concentration of money, weapons, organization, and investment in other industries, that it is a world problem that needs actions at all points of the pipeline rather than to argue over blame assignment.

Comments about "gringos [who] can't stop putting powder up their nose" are no longer helpful in the current world conditions. We're all in this together. (The U.S. needs to realize this too.) Objectively, the U.S. probably takes the most draconian action against drug users compared with Europe and other Western nations, which at least makes the U.S. more consistent in taking action against suppliers. (The wisdom of the policy is another issue I don't want to discuss here, I'm just addressing the issue of consistency.)

Morales may feel he cannot attack the cocoa growers if he is to gain the presidency, but in the longer run, if Bolivia is to become a functional free society ruled by law, the drug "shadow governments" will have to be broken. We in the U.S. faced an embryonic version with our mobsters in the 30's, but breaking the power of the new international "gangsters" of the drug trade, the Russian mafia, the influx of Central American gangs into the U.S., and their ilk will need transnational cooperation and resources and committment.

[Randinho]

It's coca, not cocoa. Cocoa is what you put in hot milk to make it tasty in the winter.

I disagree with you about the supply side of drug use. Coca leaf had been used for centuries in the Andes without problems. They shouldn't have to stop growing a plant that is perfectly legal and in many respectshas uses that are beneficial.

Heroin from Afghan poppies goes to the West. Cocaine from Bolivia's coca plants goes north and to Europe. The ones who pay the price in the Drug War for this more often than not are the people in the countries where this stuff is grown like Colombia, Bolivia and Afghanistan. If the demand side is dealt with more effectively and supply continues to outstrip demand, then the cost of doing business will make it prohibitive to continue.

[civil truth]

Coca leaf had been used for centuries in the Andes without problems. They shouldn't have to stop growing a plant that is perfectly legal and in many respects has uses that are beneficial.

On the basis of "should" I agree: coca farmers shouldn't have to bear the burden of the failure of the developed world to curb its appetite for cocaine. It's also true that more is demanded of those who have more.

The problem from what I've been reading is that we've moved beyond "who's to blame" -- the world has irrevocably intruded on Bolivia's coca [thank you for correcting me] market and has already destroyed the centuries-old traditional infrastruture.

It's somewhat like the decline of the family farm here in the U.S. The agriculture industry here has irrevocably changed, through no fault of the family farmer, and very few family farms are likely to survive -- and those that do survive at that scale will have to be very savvy entrepreneurs and highly alert and adaptable to changing market conditions -- as I've clearly seen from reading the weekly newletter we get from the CSA organic farm we get a weekly veggie box from.

So perhaps where we differ, Randy, may not be over the specific issue of "depenalization" -- indeed, I don't know enough about this to intelligently take a position. For that matter, I'm not clear on a strategy to reduce demand that will have more of an impact than the current approach. Indeed there seems to be disagreement over how to measure effectiveness.

Rather, I think the international drug trade has escalated beyond the stage where any part of the pipeline can continue to be in a stage of denial about being involved in the problem -- and must therefore act to be part of the solution. The U.S. cannot say that the primary answer is reducing supply just as Bolivia cannot say that the primary answer is reducing demand. When we all take a new attitude of shared responsibility, then there may be hope of a solution. Finger pointing is not a solution in my mind; whereas you seem to prefer to continue pointing the finger at the U.S. and Europe.

However, your writings indicate that you generally do not subscribe to simplistic positions. Perhaps the missing piece in the picture is whether you see an effective alternative strategy for reducing demand that really can undercut the illegal drug traders.